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The traditional deterrence-based paradigm of civil liability may 
be understood as indirect market regulation, as the risk of incurring 
liability for damages provides an incentive to invest in safety. Such 
an approach, however, has proven to be inappropriate in medical 
civil liability. Extensive literature shows that the increase in the 
asymmetric protection of patients by extending medical civil liabil-
ity beyond a certain limit does not improve safety; instead, that 
strategy determines the adoption of “defensive” techniques (the so-
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called “defensive medicine”). Paradoxically, this approach leads to 
a reduction in market efficiency and overall patient safety. 
The traditional paradigm of medical civil liability, moreover, is 
very likely to prevent the intensive use of artificial intelligence and 
robotization to further develop the healthcare landscape. In fact, 
under the current paradigm of civil liability, redress is allowed only 
insofar “somebody” is identified as liable to pay damages (either 
because of fault or based on strict liability). However, robots and 
software may “behave” far independently from instructions initially 
provided by designers and programmers. This possibility may rep-
resent a disincentive to new AI technologies, as in this model de-
signers and programmers could be held liable even if the damage 
derives from the “correct” operation of algorithms and robots. 
This article proposes that the law of redress in healthcare should 
evolve from an issue of civil liability to one of financial management 
of losses. No-fault redress schemes could be an interesting and val-
uable regulatory strategy in order to allow such an evolution. Also, 
some pieces of “no fault” legislation are discussed, and a few pro-
posals and comments are provided. 
 
Keywords: healthcare, medical malpractice, civil liability, “no-
fault,” strict liability, guidelines, artificial intelligence, robots 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Civil liability may be considered, under a functional point of 
view, as a technique of indirect market regulation, since the risk to 
incur liability for damages provides an incentive to invest in safety.1 
The idea is that any raise of the stick of civil liability for a given 
activity would determine a corresponding increase of efforts, by 
firms and professionals operating in the relevant market, aimed at 
reducing the risk or compensation until the point where, roughly 
 
 1. On the different “functions” of civil liability, among others, see H. 
Koziol, Comparative conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 746 (H. Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015). 




speaking, any further investment in safety would cost more than the 
risk to pay redress to damaged clients and users. 
The above technique of indirect market regulation may work 
only insofar as the risk to compensate damages is allocated onto the 
same subject called to invest further resources in safety. Therefore, 
such a paradigm2 of civil liability invariably requires identification 
of a person liable for redress, which is likely to be the producer of a 
given product of the provider of a given service.3 
This deterrence-based approach works in several scenarios (e.g., 
damages for defective products), but is inappropriate in others, such 
as healthcare, where increased liability may lead, and has actually 
lead, to “defensive medicine” strategies (i.e., practices that are not 
in the interest of patients, aimed at protecting doctors against poten-
tial plaintiffs),4 which have proven to be harmful for the whole sys-
tem and also for patients themselves.5 
It seems, therefore, necessary to unwind the increase of civil li-
ability against doctors and hospitals in order to guarantee that 
healthcare systems may develop a more efficient and safer approach. 
 
 2. A paradigm is the conceptual tool defining methods and problems and 
solving problems accepted by a given community: see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (U. Chicago Press 1962). Paradigms influence in-
terpretation in two ways. First, they allow one to detect objects and relationships 
that each paradigm allows to detect, but they prevent detection of objects and 
relationships incompatible or “hidden” to it (id. at 151). Paradigms, in other 
words, provide schemes with which is it possible to “order” the world (id. at 44), 
so that without such schemes there would be only a “great blooming, buzzing 
confusion” (id. at 141, quoting William James). Second, and consequently, the 
paradigm accepted in each moment represents the conceptual tool with which one 
defines problems that are considered solvable and the relevant solution methods. 
See id. at 58 and 138, where reference is made to “normative” functions of para-
digms. 
 3. See infra §§ II and III. 
 4. “Defensive medicine occurs when doctors order tests, procedures, or vis-
its, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily 
solely) because of concern about malpractice liability.” U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE 1 (Government Printing Office 1994). 
For the sake of completeness, one should note that some authors contest the rele-
vance of defensive medicine in this field; see, e.g., M. J. Saks & S. Landsman, 
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine, 30 HEALTH MATRIX 25. 
 5. See infra § IV. 




This is especially so because the negative consequences brought by 
defensive medicine are particularly harsh, both in terms of costs for 
national communities and of the increase in other negative external-
ities. 
This complex situation does not allow for simple solutions but 
requires a well-designed action to allow public healthcare to remain 
in place the way we know it. The claim in this paper is that the prob-
lem of defensive medicine could be much reduced by introducing 
an alternative compensation system for damage caused by medical 
treatments.  
This claim, calling for an evolution towards an alternative para-
digm, may also be extended to artificial intelligence markets, as they 
are likely to be prone to similar negative externalities when civil li-
ability is applied as a regulatory strategy based on deterrence. 
In this article, I propose that “no-fault” systems, existing in 
many countries, may provide direction for a future reform. The con-
cept of “no fault” is used here with reference to a system where re-
dress is provided by a dedicated fund regardless of any fault by the 
agent being established; it does not make reference, instead, to strict-
liability schemes that likewise ignore “fault” as a condition to im-
pose liability but operate in the opposite direction, by imposing the 
obligation to redress on agents regardless of their culpability. 
I also recall peculiarities and weaknesses of such schemes, in 
order to demarcate the scope of their usability as models for reform. 
As evidenced in the title, this article is aimed at representing as a 
call toward the setting of a research agenda on the issue, rather than 
having the ambition of providing fully worked-out answers. These 
may be a long way ahead, but I believe that a clear statement of the 
pitfalls of current legislation and the scope of its future reformation 
represent a sound step in that direction. 




II. THE “TRADITIONAL” PARADIGM OF CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON 
DETERRENCE 
The current paradigm of civil liability laws is mainly based on 
the assumption that civil liability plays and should play an important 
role in deterrence. It is thought that any increase of liability on pro-
ducers and suppliers of goods and services will increase investments 
in safety, aimed at preventing liability. The belief is that the tougher 
civil liability rules on producers and other professionals, the higher 
the overall level of safety within the system.6 
As noted above, such technique of indirect market regulation 
may work only insofar as the risk to compensate damages is allo-
cated to the same subject called to invest further resources in safety. 
This may be done via fault-based liability or strict liability. The first 
one is rooted in fault and requires an “offender,” i.e., a person found 
responsible for a given damage and therefore liable to redress it. 
In fact, the idea that civil liability requires somebody’s “fault” is 
deeply rooted in legal thinking: it emerged in Justinian law and was 
further consolidated in the jus commune and canon law,7 beginning 
approximately one thousand and five hundred years ago. This idea, 
inspiring the whole system of civil liability as a paradigmatic prin-
ciple, was called, in German literature, the “dogma of fault” 
(Verschuldensdogma). This approach is represented by the well-
known expression “Nicht der Shaden verpflichtet zum Schadenser-
satz, sondern die Schuld” (the obligation to pay compensation de-
rives from fault, not from damage), formulated by von Jhering.8 
 
 6. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (Yale U. Press 1970); R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 336-
338 (6th ed., Pearson/Addison Wesley 2008); J. Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, As-
sessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability After Calabresi, 77 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 135 (2014). More recently, see Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deter-
rence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2011). 
 7. Among others, see H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, 1 TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET 
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 422 
(5th ed., Éditions Montchrestien 1957). 
 8. R. VON JHERING, DAS SHULDMOMENT IM RÖMISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 40 
(Brühl 1867). 




A. Evolution Toward a “Solidarity Approach” 
The paradigmatic centrality of “deterrence” evolved over time 
but remained in place when most relevant social, political and eco-
nomic changes made legal thinking advance toward an increasing 
quest for solidarity in all western legal systems, regardless of their 
civil-law or common-law basic structure9—though the common law 
is traditionally less concerned with solidarity in private relationships 
than the civil law is. 
The quest for solidarity, greatly prompted by the factual conse-
quences and upheavals derived from the industrial revolution, made 
legislators to consider it unjust that damages following certain (in-
trinsically risky) activities should be borne by consumers and other 
end users of goods and services unless “fault” by producers or other 
professionals could be proven in court. 
Such evolution brought a relevant variation in civil liability leg-
islations (within the same paradigm, I believe), which lead to an 
“asymmetric” discipline of civil liability and to the adoption of loss-
spreading strategies for civil liability laws.10 Under such develop-
ment, which evolved throughout the whole 20th century, legislators 
reallocated the cost of accidents from customers and end users to 
producers and other professionals, since the latter were thought to 
be in a better position to spread the cost of accidents and arrange for 
appropriate prevention policies. 
 
 9. In Italy see, e.g., A. DE CUPIS, IL DANNO: TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RE-
SPONSABILITÀ CIVILE 66 (Giuffrè 1979); in France, see L. Josserand, Les trans-
ports, in XVIII TRAITÉ GÉNÉRAL THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 
457 (Edmond-Eugéne Thaller ed. 1910); in Germany, see H. SPERL, ÜBER DAS 
SCHADENERSATZRECHT NACH DEM DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE 
154 (Manz Verlag 1902); in England, see M. LUNNEY & K. OLIPHANT, TORT LAW 
TEXT AND MATERIALS 15 (Oxford U. Press 2000). For a more general and com-
parative perspective, see S. TAYLOR, DIFFERING CULTURES OF CIVIL LIABILITY 
IN MEDICAL ACCIDENT LIABILITY AND REDRESS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW 
(Cambridge U. Press 2015). 
 10. M. COMPORTI, ESPOSIZIONE AL PERICOLO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Mo-
rano 1965). For an economic point of view, see R. D. COOTER, Economic Theories 
of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11-30 (1991). 




In other words, liability became less dependent on the fault that 
caused the damage and was more and more dependent upon the risky 
nature of some activities (among which one should especially note 
industrial production). 
This need to reallocate the cost of accidents to producers and 
other professionals widened the potential of deterrence raised by 
civil liability law. The borders of civil liability were extended be-
yond the cases where plaintiffs could establish “fault” by the pro-
ducer or professional, i.e., to all those cases where producers and 
professionals could not show that the damage was not attributable 
to them, cases in which there was scientific uncertainty as to the 
cause of the harmful effects or even where such cause was un-
known.11  
This evolution was pursued through similar techniques in differ-
ent western legal systems, mainly the reversal of the burden of proof 
and the imposition of strict liability on producers and other profes-
sionals, the development of the precautionary principle in many 
fields of application, etc. 
In medical civil liability, this path included sector-specific evo-
lutions, such as the imposition of an obligation of result with respect 
to many therapies and especially routine ones (in English law 
through the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,12 in Germany through the An-
scheinsbeweis or prima facie Beweis doctrine,13 etc.). Some juris-
dictions even turned extra-contractual medical liability into contrac-
tual liability (which favors patients, inter alia, as regards the burden 
of proof) following the German doctrine of faktische 
 
 11. R. MONTINARO, DUBBIO SCIENTIFICO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Giuffrè 
2012); for an economic analysis of law perspective, see M. G. Faure, L. T. 
Visscher, F. Weber, Liability for Unknown Risk – A Law and Economics Perspec-
tive, 7 J. EUR. TORT LAW 198-228 (2016). 
 12. See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.  
 13. M. STAUCH, THE LAW OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND AND GER-
MANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 73 (Hart Publ’g 2008). 




Vertragsverhältnisse,14 as it happened in Italy with the theory of 
contatto sociale.15 
As briefly noted above, this evolution, even if relevant and 
somehow innovative, represented mere incremental advancement of 
the same traditional paradigm based on deterrence. In fact, the de-
velopment just summarized was limited, basically, only to reallocate 
the “cost of accidents” from customers and users to producers and 
professionals (in healthcare, from patients to doctors and hospitals) 
within the same conceptual and legal framework already in place 
(including the deterrence function). 
What changed, in other terms, was the balancing of interests, not 
rethinking techniques to satisfy them, insofar as the concept of de-
terrence was widened. In some cases that widening was toward strict 
liability, simply in order to widen its potential also to cases where 
fault could not be positively assessed in court, with the aim of in-
ducing producers and other professionals to increase investments in 
safety accordingly.16 
The same (mere) incremental evolution may be observed in the 
adoption of loss-spreading techniques, such as the provision of man-
datory insurance for producers and professionals. In fact, mandatory 
insurance is mainly thought to protect damaged consumers and other 
end users of goods and services from the risk that producers or other 
professionals have insufficient patrimony to pay redress. 
It is certainly true that the development of insurance is based on 
a solidarity model, aimed at spreading losses among all insured pro-
ducers and professionals, and it is likewise true that in markets 
where mandatory insurance is provided the deterrence element is di-
luted by insurance itself, insofar as the extra cost of negligence is 
 
 14. G. Haupt, Über faktische Vertragsverhältnisse, 124 LEIPZIGER 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE STUDIEN (1943). 
 15. Cass. Jan. 22, 1999, No. 589; on this issue, see C. Castronovo, Obblighi 
di protezione, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA (Treccani 1990). 
 16. R. SAVATIER, 1 TRAITÉ DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN-
ÇAIS CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIF, PROFESSIONNEL, PROCÉDURAL 3 (2d ed., Librairie gé-
nérale de droit et de jurisprudence 1945); M. COMPORTI, ESPOSIZIONE AL PERI-
COLO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Morano 1965). 




marginally distributed amongst all the insured. However, the mere 
existence of insurance coverage may not necessarily modify the tra-
ditional paradigm of civil liability based on deterrence. In fact, in-
surance determines a reallocation of the obligation to pay compen-
sation, but producers and other professionals may remain liable for 
damages in case insurance coverage is not applicable (e.g., when the 
event is not covered by the contract or in case of willful misconduct 
or, often, even gross negligence). In any case, they remain subject 
to deterrence at least indirectly, since after paying compensation in-
surers would shift to the relevant producers and professionals the 
cost of any redress paid on their behalf by applying higher insurance 
premiums.17 
B. The Remaining Centrality of the “Traditional” Paradigm 
The above-mentioned paradigm may be considered indisputable 
in legislation, where civil liability is invariably considered also for 
its potential of deterrence and, therefore, the increase of civil liabil-
ity is considered as a regulatory technique to foster investments in 
safety by producers and professionals. Also in law-and-economics 
literature, the paradigm is very rarely contested: it is sometimes dis-
puted if civil liability rules should be imposed in some sectors to 
enhance safety instead of ex ante regulation and when such rules 
could be capable of producing appropriate incentives. However, it 
is assumed that civil liability plays an indirect-regulation role, inso-
far as the cost of compensating harmed customers and end users 
(whether or not it is spread out to the entire sector by insurance) 
represents an incentive of producers and other professionals to in-
vest in safer products and services. 
 
 17. The relationship between insurance coverage and deterrence is discussed 
by G. Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK 
AND INS.—ISSUES AND PRACTICE 277 (2006); H. Luntz, Torts and Insurance: The 
Effect on Deterrence (conference paper) (Dec. 2010), available at 
https://perma.cc/GH6A-2JG9; S. Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regu-
lation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.—ISSUES AND 
PRACTICE 166 (2000). 




This consensus on the traditional paradigm prevails even when 
civil liability rules are approached critically, for instance, by authors 
reconsidering the efficiency of civil liability rules in preventing 
safety risks. In pursuing such strategies, however, they seem to sug-
gest a preference for ex ante regulation with reference to some mar-
kets.18 Occasionally, the literature points out that the incentives pro-
duced on safety by civil liability rules may be inappropriate in some 
markets. However, critics tend to focus on the context in which such 
rules are applied rather than on the rules and their design.19  
It is not common, in fact, that steps are taken to rethink and re-
design the concept of civil liability; most of the times, the latter 
keeps being considered, as such, invariably designed as a deterrence 
instrument (even if sometimes not appropriate) having a direct pos-
itive impact on safety. 
Even sophisticated studies at the supranational level have con-
sidered, and still consider, civil liability as performing the central 
function of deterrence along with that of compensation.20 A similar 
approach is to be found in the Principles of European Tort Law 
(PETL) drafted by the European Group on Tort Law,21 especially as 
regards linking redress to someone’s liability to compensate damage 
(art. 1:101(1)) and to liability based either on fault or “strict liabil-
ity” (Title III). This comes as no surprise, since the Principles rep-
resent a summary of existing European laws, in which the deter-
rence-based paradigm is certainly in place. 
 
 18. See, e.g., M. G. Faure, The Complementary Roles of Liability, Regulation 
and Insurance in Safety Management: Theory and Practice, J. RISK RES. (2014); 
M. G. Faure, Private Liability and Critical Infrastructure, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 
229-243 (2015). 
 19. See, e.g., Rebecca K. Viscusi, Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?, 
35 REGULATION 24-31 (2012). 
 20. OECD, Medical Malpractice. Prevention, Insurance and Coverage Op-
tions, 11 POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE 27 (2006).  
 21.  EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: 
TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Springer 2005). 




III. THE “BREACH” OF THE “TRADITIONAL” PARADIGM IN 
HEALTHCARE AND DEFENSIVE MEDICINE 
The deterrence paradigm proves to be reliable and appropriate 
in several instances, e.g., with reference to general consumer legis-
lation such as Council Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions of the Member States concerning liability for defective prod-
ucts, imposing strict liability on producers for damage caused by 
defective products.22 
The paradigm, however, proves inappropriate in other cases, 
such as healthcare. A rich and valuable literature shows that the in-
crease in the asymmetric protection of patients by extending medical 
civil liability beyond a certain limit does not improve safety23 but, 
instead, determines the adoption of “defensive” strategies (the so-
called “defensive medicine”) and brings about a number of negative 
externalities that are listed below. 
A significant externality is that costs related to defensive medi-
cine account for a relevant percentage of the overall cost incurred 
with respect to national health systems. Preliminarily, one should 
note that health expenditure binds a relevant part of the GDP 
 
 22. The liability for defective products clearly shows how the function of de-
terrence is implemented, in civil law systems, pursuant the idea of “solidarity,” as 
evidenced above. One may think, in this respect, of the very inspiration of Di-
rective 85/374/EEC, insofar as liability without fault on the part of the producer 
(established under art. 1) was thought to be “the sole means of adequately solving 
the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment 
of the risks inherent in modern technological production.” The deterrence func-
tion is evidenced in different passages of that directive, e.g., art. 6, which provides 
that “a product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is 
entitled to expect,” taking into account all relevant circumstances. 
  On this issue it is possible to read, among others, the five reports on the 
application of Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products 
(1995, 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2018), available at https://perma.cc/P8EP-AQZS. 
 23. OECD, supra note 20, at 16; M. Catino, Blame Culture and Defensive 
Medicine, 11 COGNITION, TECH. & WORK 245-253; M. Catino & S. Celotti, The 
Problem of Defensive Medicine: Two Italian Surveys, in DETECTION AND PREVEN-
TION OF ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS 206 (R. Beuscart, W. Hackl & C. Nøhr eds., IOS 
Press 2009); M. Catino, Why do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? The Side-
Effects of Medical Litigation, 15 SAFETY SCIENCE MONITOR 1 (2011).  




throughout the world and is currently moving upward. Limiting at-
tention to the last years, the world average expenditure in healthcare 
grew, from 2000 to 2017, from 8.622% to 9.896% of the GDP. In 
the euro area the increase moved from 8.640% to 10.135%; in the 
U.S., from 12.503% to 17.061%.24 
It is not possible to provide any accurate estimate of how much 
such an expense is due to defensive medicine; however, available 
data show that the latter amounts to a rather high percentage thereof. 
As an example, one may consider that a study, conducted by authors 
from Harvard University and the University of Melbourne and pub-
lished in 2010, concluded that more than 80% of the overall annual 
USA medical liability system costs (estimated to be $55.6 billion in 
2008 dollars, or 2.4% of total healthcare spending), i.e., $45.6 bil-
lion, were due to defensive medicine.25 As regards Italy, in 2014-
2015 defensive medicine was estimated to cost roundly 10 billion 
euros  a year (i.e., 10.5% of the GDP) and to represent the first cat-
egory of healthcare waste (26% of the total).26 One may also add the 
following: 
− over-prescription of exams, therapies, and medicines that 
causes an increase of iatrogenic risks and damage;  
− some inefficiencies and loss of quality of the healthcare sys-
tem;  
− abandonment of the sector by insurers and an overall in-
crease of insurance premiums; 
 
 24. World Bank, Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD BANK 
OPEN DATA, available at https://perma.cc/467C-Z5CM. 
 25. M. M. Mello, A. Chandra, A. A. Gawande & D. M. Studdert, National 
Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1569 (2010). It ought 
to be noted that such a number did not “attempt to estimate social costs or benefits 
of the malpractice system, such as damage to physicians’ reputations or any de-
terrent effect it may provide.” 
 26. V. Di Gregorio, A. M. Ferriero, M. L. Specchia, S. Capizzi, G. Damiani 
& W. Ricciardi, Defensive Medicine in Europe: Which Solutions?, 25 EUR. J. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 145. This study also highlighted that in Europe litigation for med-
ical malpractice increased significantly over the last decade, ranging from more 
than 50% in Britain, Scandinavia, the Baltic countries, and Eastern Europe to 
more than 200–500% in Germany, Italy, the Iberian and Mediterranean Area 
countries. 




− abandonment of risky specialities by doctors, hospitals and 
universities; 
− the refusal to provide treatment in particularly serious cases. 
What is most relevant is that, in some sectors such as healthcare, 
beyond certain limits the current paradigm of civil liability based on 
deterrence is completely unreliable, since further increases of civil 
liability do not procure any gain in safety and, to the contrary and 
paradoxically, lead to a reduction of market efficiency and overall 
patient safety. 
A. Defensive Medicine as an Obstacle Toward Safer Healthcare 
Risk Management 
Moreover, the deterrence paradigm, as it is currently understood 
and applied in most western jurisdictions, produces perverse effects 
capable of preventing, or at least hindering, the development of 
well-grounded risk-management systems.  
In fact, several civil liability systems, inspired by the traditional 
paradigm, provide doctors with a disincentive to share information 
on risks, harmful events, and latent errors and failures. They are re-
quired to define evidence-based safety standards and, therefore, de-
velop reliable guidelines,27 since this may increase their risk of be-
ing held liable. As an example, a research carried out in 2006-2007 
on approximately one thousand doctors in eighteen Italian hospitals 
showed a shocking result: the great majority of doctors considered 
reporting and learning systems very useful for their profession, but 
less than half of them made any contributions of relevant infor-
mation fearing legal consequences.28 Italian legislation on this issue 
changed in 2017 in light of this problem, even if it is not clear 
 
 27. J. REASON, HUMAN ERROR (Cambridge U. Press 1990); C. Bayley, What 
Medical Errors can Tell us About Management Mistakes, in MANAGEMENT MIS-
TAKES IN HEALTHCARE: IDENTIFICATION, CORRECTION AND PREVENTION 74-83 
(P. B. Hofmann & F. Perry eds., Cambridge U. Press 2019). 
 28. See S. Albolino, R. Tartaglia, T. Bellandi, A. M. V. Amicosante, E. 
Bianchini & A. Biggeri, Patient Safety and Incident Reporting: Survey of Italian 
Healthcare Workers, 19 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY (2010). 




whether the solution proposed is capable of resolving it com-
pletely.29 
In addition, it is undisputable that evidence-based medicine 
(EBM30) nowadays allows the development of more accurate and 
reliable guidelines whose application is capable of reducing the 
overall risk of death and damage.31 However, the current civil lia-
bility rules provide doctors with a disincentive to apply them con-
sistently, since their observance may not be sufficient to relieve 
them from civil liability32: the problem seems rather well spread in 
 
 29. It ought to be noted that civil liability law was reformed, in Italy, through 
Law No. 24 of March 8, 2017. As regards the issue at stake, art. 16 provides that 
reports and documents resulting from clinical risk management cannot be ac-
quired or used in the context of legal proceedings. Even if this rule appears to take 
into consideration the problem discussed above, in the text, it still leaves two 
problems open. First of all, it is possible that such information could be published 
in the semi-annual report provided by art. 1, co. 539, let. d bis, Law No. 208 of 
December 28, 2015 on adverse events occurred within the facility, the causes that 
produced the adverse event, and the resulting initiatives put in place. Secondly, it 
is not clear whether such information could be obtained by the Ombudsman under 
art. 2 of Law 24/2017. On this issue, see E. Marchisio, Evoluzione della re-
sponsabilità civile medica e medicina “difensiva,” 1 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 
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different jurisdictions, regardless of their belonging to either civil 
law or common law traditions.33 
Interestingly, in other areas of scholarship, such problems are 
studied in depth and scholars reached the conclusion that risky ac-
tivities incorporate a certain percentage of risk depending not on the 
person performing them but on the activities themselves.34 Errors 
happen and will happen regardless of how severe civil liability is. 
There is, therefore, no point in increasing it beyond the limit where 
all actors in the relevant market are disadvantaged. 
This situation is not going toward market self-correction. In-
stead, the market is reacting by adjusting to the perverse incentives 
provided by the law, so that “medicine of jurisprudential obedi-
ence”35 is nowadays induced from doctors’ very university 
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education.36 The current situation, therefore, requires a prompt rev-
olution of the civil liability paradigm, since past increases of liability 
on doctors and hospitals in the recent past did not enhance safety 
and, instead, imposed severe negative externalities on the whole 
healthcare system.37 
B. A Claim in Favour of Relieving Doctors and Hospitals from Li-
ability 
The above-reported negative externalities could be reduced, 
without losing the safety and efficiency of the healthcare system if 
doctors and hospitals could be relieved from civil liability for dam-
ages in cases in which there is no evidence of negligence, impru-
dence, or unskillfulness and scientifically-validated standardized 
actions (guidelines, among others) are observed.  
This claim is made based on the assumption (and its relevance 
is limited insofar as this assumption is confirmed, which is to be 
verified when drafting guidelines) that following standard actions 
inspired by evidence-based medicine makes overall accidents and 
damage lower than those experienced in a system in which standards 
are not defined or observed.38 In other words: even if the observance 
of standards could determine unwanted damages on patients in some 
cases, adherence to scientifically-validated standards should be 
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promoted in all cases in which such adherence appears, at a systemic 
level, as a safer strategy than any other. 
Of course, this should not prevent doctors from leaving aside 
guidelines and standards when this appears appropriate in a particu-
lar case, in order to apply their professional knowledge. This ap-
proach should be an option in those specific instances in which, in 
their judgment, guidelines are not suitable: professional knowledge 
should not be depreciated by defensive medicine. In fact, practition-
ers understand and experience defensive medicine “as unnecessary 
and meaningless medical actions, carried out mainly because of ex-
ternal demands that run counter to the GP’s professionalism.”39 This 
possibility to depart from the standard, however, would not contra-
dict the “safe harbor” nature of adherence to the standard. 
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM OF (MEDICAL) CIVIL 
LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
As far as its scope is concerned, the law regulates economic and 
social activities in order to contribute to the pursuit of welfare. But 
the law cannot define its goals and means arbitrarily. It needs to take 
into the highest consideration the functioning of economic and so-
cial contexts addressed, in order to develop well-grounded, afforda-
ble, reliable, and effective rules.40 
As noted above, the failure of the deterrence paradigm may be 
observed and empirically proved. This conclusion is indisputable 
when one notes that the recent increases in civil liability worsened 
the position of both doctors and patients, also plaguing healthcare 
systems with significant negative externalities. A radical modifica-
tion is therefore required. 
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Such a modification appears particularly important these days 
because of the incentives to practice “defensive medicine.” What 
may even be more relevant, however, is that the traditional paradigm 
of medical civil liability is very likely to prevent the development of 
markets toward intensive use of artificial intelligence and robotiza-
tion, which are likely to play an increasingly more relevant role in 
healthcare, especially through machine learning and deep learning 
technologies. 
In fact, artificial intelligence can contribute to healthcare in two 
main areas. The first one relates to developing medical knowledge 
and standards. This is happening through the use of sophisticated 
algorithms that combine big data in order to relate a much higher 
number of variables and allow drafting medical guidelines and da-
tabases that are incredibly more reliable.41 Such a change, it ought 
to be noted, will evolve sharply also due to the pursuit of open-ac-
cess and open-data strategies by most legal systems, including the 
EU.42 
The second one relates to the use of artificial intelligence in per-
forming medical activities—artificial intelligence provides robots 
with the ability to execute even complex interventions with an in-
creasingly higher autonomy.43 
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Even if artificial intelligence can contribute to develop much 
safer healthcare, its development could be hindered by the “tradi-
tional” paradigm of civil liability law. In fact, the current paradigm 
allows redress to damaged patients under the rules that need to iden-
tify a “somebody” liable to pay such compensation either because 
of his or her fault or by virtue of a strict liability rule. This means 
that, in case of damage produced by a robot, judges and lawyers 
would seek to impose civil liability either on its producer or on the 
author of the computer program that makes it work—the only 
“somebody” available to be held liable; the “nearest human,” as it 
was noted.44  
This does not consider that artificial intelligence systems evolve 
over time (and will do so even more in the near future) on the basis 
of the information and feedback gathered and processed by thou-
sands of different shared sources (the so-called “machine learning” 
and “deep learning”). In fact, it may be said that robots do not only 
perform activities, they also learn how to perform them over time.45 
In fact, the possibility that robots and programs “behave” far in-
dependently from instructions initially provided by programmers 
and constructors is extremely probable. This possibility has led the 
European Parliament to propose “creating a specific legal status for 
robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots 
could be established as having the status of electronic persons with 
specific rights and obligations.”46 I understand that the main reason 
for this proposal is that of using legal personality as a technique to 
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hold the robot liable and, therefore, insulate its obligations (includ-
ing redress for damage) from those of its producer and programmer. 
I believe that such proposal is undesirable, since robots cannot and 
should not be considered “persons” under current civil law.47 That 
approach, however, clearly shows the need to shift “obligations” 
away from producers and programmers when robots are capable of 
acting rather autonomously from their original design.48 
All what was noted above with reference to artificial intelligence 
clearly shows that the cause-and-effect relationship as regards dam-
age causation in this field might not be linear as we are used to be-
lieving49 (though not everybody agrees50) and that adoption of a 
“no-fault” approach (within the meaning defined above, under §151) 
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to medical liability could prove more efficient than the current sys-
tem. 
There is undoubtedly no convergence on this issue and many 
proposals have been made52 in order to address artificial intelligence 
devices, either fault-based rules53 or strict-liability regimes,54 in-
cluding an extension of the rules on defective products55 or on ani-
mals under the custody of humans.56 However, I claim that the ap-
plication of the traditional paradigm of civil liability would not fos-
ter safety even with respect to these technological issues; instead, it 
would expose producers and programmers to unforeseeable and po-
tentially unlimited claims for civil liability without any “fault” or 
any disregard for a foreseeable risk being in place. This would likely 
deter them from entering the market or developing it, thus hindering 
technological evolution—what is sometimes called the risk of “tech-
nology chilling.”57 
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Also, in this case it appears that the problems and disincentives 
evidenced above are somehow connected to the issue of standardi-
zation and standardized action. In my opinion, the above-noted 
problems and disincentives, capable of affecting the market of arti-
ficial intelligence devices, could be reduced if producers and pro-
grammers could be relieved from civil liability for damage at least 
in certain cases: when there is no evidence of negligence, impru-
dence, or unskillfulness and the robot (both in its physical compo-
nents and in its artificial intelligence aspects) complied with scien-
tifically validated production and programming standards.58 
Of course, in this case respect for standards could lead to un-
wanted damage to patients. However, my claim is made on the same 
assumption (to be further verified in all relevant cases) that in sev-
eral cases, the adoption of artificial intelligence and robots deter-
mines a relevant increase in safety within healthcare systems and 
reduces the risk of injury and death when compared to healthcare 
based only on human action.59  
It is undisputable that investments in research on new technolo-
gies should be fostered and supported or, at least, not discouraged: 
new technologies produce a sensible increase in safety within 
healthcare systems and reduce the risk of injury and death, as avail-
able data already show with respect to the current situation.60 
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This is one of the reasons why I believe that modern technology, 
sometimes, requires new specific legislation instead of mere adjust-
ing of existing laws; a “law of the horse,” as it was said61: without 
appropriate ad hoc legislation, in fact, rules developed centuries ago 
in very different contexts could provide perverse incentives and pro-
duce undesirable negative externalities. 
V. SHIFTING LIABILITY AWAY FROM DOCTORS, HOSPITALS, AND 
PRODUCERS AND PROGRAMMERS OF AI DEVICES 
As shown above, the healthcare system is affected by a set of 
perverse incentives induced by the traditional paradigm of civil lia-
bility law. The problem could be reduced by shifting the liability 
away from doctors, hospitals, and producers and programmers of AI 
devices. 
What is most important to note, however, is that such shifting 
away should not reduce civil liability and the corresponding pa-
tients’ right to redress in case of damage. In fact, on the patients’ 
side, claims for redress based on health injury are commonly recog-
nized, in most jurisdictions, as deriving from acknowledged consti-
tutional rights to health. The right to health was also internationally 
recognized in the Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization (1946); it was then included in art. 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and art. 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).  
Moreover, the “solidarity” approach that now pervades legal 
systems, briefly mentioned above,62 would not allow that damaged 
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patients not be compensated for any damage incurred because of 
medical therapies. Redress in favor of damaged patients may be con-
sidered, as such, a non-controversial right, which would be rather 
difficult to repeal. 
However, at closer sight, the redress of wrongs suffered by med-
ical patients does not necessarily imply that the obligation to pay be 
imposed on doctors and hospitals, or producers and programmers of 
AI devices. What the solidarity approach requires, in fact, is that the 
loss does not remain with the damaged patients; its imposition on 
doctors and hospitals, or producers and programmers of AI devices, 
should depend on whether it enhances or, instead, weakens safety. 
VI. FROM CIVIL LIABILITY TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LOSSES 
The thesis in this article is that a new legal approach should be 
developed in medical civil liability law, aimed at maintaining re-
dress for damage on the patients’ side (micro-systemic level) but 
shifting the obligation to pay for such redress away from doctors and 
hospitals (when there is not evidence of negligence, imprudence, or 
unskillfulness and scientifically validated standards of action are 
complied with). A further claim is that a similar development should 
shift away that obligation also from producers and programmers of 
artificial intelligence devices, when there is no evidence of negli-
gence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and scientifically validated 
standards of production and programming are complied with. This 
evolution would reduce incentives to practice defensive medicine, 
reduce disincentives to invest in medical technology, and decrease 
inefficiencies and negative externalities deriving from defensive 
medicine (macro-systemic level).63 
In other words, the law of redress for medical damage should 
evolve from an issue of civil liability to one of financial management 
of losses, which would take into a much higher account the 
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“systemic” need of appropriate functioning of complex institutions 
and markets such as modern healthcare systems. One may note that 
this evolution could appropriately be carried out at the European 
level, even if the matter is rather controversial and excessively cum-
bersome to be discussed in this article.64 
In fact, what appears to favor a single patient in the short run 
(e.g., sentencing a doctor to compensate the damage suffered by the 
patient after a very complex surgical intervention, whether or not 
evidence of fault is adduced) may eventually damage all future pa-
tients if it prevents the whole healthcare system from functioning 
appropriately and developing into a more technological, evidence-
based, and safer system (because of the incentives and disincentives 
brought about by the sentencing itself; in the example: doctors 
would refuse future complex surgical interventions). 
The possibility of balancing these two apparently conflicting 
goals is not unknown to some legal systems. “No-fault” legislation 
on redress following medical damage (within the meaning of “no-
fault” adopted here, which makes reference to a system where re-
dress is provided by a dedicated fund regardless of any fault by the 
agent being established and not based on strict-liability schemes65) 
may be found in some jurisdictions like New Zealand, Finland, Den-
mark, and Sweden.66 
A detailed exam of such models would fall beyond the scope of 
this article. However, it may be noteworthy to highlight that “no-
fault” schemes appear to differ, at a very broad view, with respect 
to five main variables: the extent of eligibility criteria for compen-
sation (which may be limited to specified damage, as it happens in 
Virginia and Florida with respect to birth-related neurological 
 
 64. See, e.g., F. Toriello, La responsabilità medica in prospettiva (incerta) di 
armonizzazione europea, 2 RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA 291 (2017); G. Wagner, The 
Project of Harmonizing European Tort Law, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2005 670 
(H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2006); H. Koziol, Comparative Con-
clusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
686 (H. Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015). 
 65. See supra § I. 
 66. See OECD, supra note 20, for a presentation on these systems. 




injury,67 or apply to all “treatment injuries,” as in New Zealand after 
reform in 200568); whether the scheme prevents continued access to 
courts or not; how these schemes are funded (mainly: privately, pub-
licly, or through a mixed scheme69); whether redress is imposed a 
financial cap or not; definition of the financial entitlement (only eco-
nomic or also non-economic damages).70 It is not clear whether such 
pieces of legislation are simply capable of being “transplanted” into 
different legal systems and of reducing (if not resolving) the prob-
lem of defensive medicine. Several issues need be taken into ac-
count in this respect.  
First, such foreign “no-fault systems” are not targeted at the 
problem of standardization and are mainly conditioned upon the 
damaged patient waiving civil litigation, instead. Therefore, they 
have a narrower scope with respect to the issue of enhancing stand-
ardization in view of a safer system. I propose, instead, that, as far 
as healthcare is concerned, legal systems should tolerate that the ap-
plication of scientifically validated standards could determine harm-
ful consequences in individual cases insofar as, under a systemic 
 
 67. In regard to Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 et seq., known as 
the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act. Further infor-
mation may be found on the program website: https://perma.cc/9AE9-SNME. 
With respect to Florida, see FLA. STAT. §§ 766-301 et seq. Further information 
may be found on the program website: https://perma.cc/5S2F-KYZ5. 
 68. In fact, reforms in 2005 removed the final “fault” element still present in 
the system and designed it as a true “no-fault” scheme, see M. Bismark & R. Pat-
erson, No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury Compensa-
tion, Provider Accountability, And Patient Safety, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1. 
 69. In regard to financing, there are several models available, ranging from 
systems financed through contributions made by healthcare providers to systems 
funded via tax revenues. See OECD, supra note 20, for a comparative analysis on 
this issue; M.M. Mello, A. Kachalia & D.M. Studdert, Administrative Compensa-
tion for Medical Injuries: Lessons from Three Foreign Systems (2011), available 
at https://perma.cc/F9LQ-AMUS; K. DICKSON, K. HINDS, H. BURCHETT, G. 
BRUNTON, C. STANSFIELD & J. THOMAS, NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SCHEMES: A 
RAPID REALIST REVIEW (UCL Institute of Education 2016); T. Vandersteegen, 
W. Marneffe, I. Cleemput & L. Vereeck, The Impact of No-Fault Compensation 
on Health Care Expenditures: An Empirical Study of OECD Countries, 119 
HEALTH POLICY 367 (2015). 
 70. These variables are compared among different “no-fault” compensation 
schemes in DICKSON ET AL., supra note 69.  




point of view, such application allows a significant reduction of the 
overall risks and damages.71  
Even if this idea is somehow disruptive and would influence the 
way this issue is understood, also under an ethical point of view, its 
feasibility may be found in some small and limited pieces of legis-
lation (without any possibility of extensive application by way of 
interpretation) that provide similar mechanisms of compensation in 
standardized medical activities bearing some statistical risks but 
much more beneficial effects: it is the case, for example, of compen-
sation following adverse effects attributed to vaccination, whose ad-
verse effects are very rare in comparison with the more than 2.5 mil-
lion deaths prevented only in 2008 by vaccination.72 The issue re-
sembles, under this point of view, that of mandatory seat belt in 
 
 71. In other and more detailed words, under the proposal made in this article, 
redress of (statistically) “inevitable” damages resulting from compliance with sci-
entifically-validated standards, within sectors characterized by high risk and high 
scientific or technological content, should not be imposed on persons performing 
the relevant activities or supplying products to the market as long as there is no 
evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and given criteria, to be 
developed within an agreed framework, are complied with (e.g., treatment is ap-
propriate, guidelines complied with scientific validation principles and were ap-
plied appropriately, etc.). 
 72. A review of World Health Organization Member States based on 2018 
data showed that no-fault compensation systems for vaccine injuries have been 
developed in a few high-income countries for more than 50 years, mostly at the 
central or federal government level, and are government-funded. Claimants are 
compensated with either: lump-sums; amounts calculated based on medical care 
costs and expenses, loss of earnings or earning capacity; or monetary compensa-
tion calculated based on pain and suffering, emotional distress, permanent impair-
ment or loss of function; or combination of those. It is noteworthy that, in most 
jurisdictions, vaccine injury claimants have the right to seek damages either 
through civil litigation or from a compensation scheme, but not both simultane-
ously: see R. G. Mungwira, Ch. Guillard, A. Saldaña, N. Okabe, H. Petousis-Har-
ris, E. Agbenu, L. Rodewald & P.L.F. Zuber, Global Landscape Analysis of No-
Fault Compensation Programmes for Vaccine Injuries: A Review and Survey of 
Implementing Countries, 15 PLoS ONE (2020). On this issue, see also WHO, 
STATE OF THE WORLD’S VACCINES AND IMMUNIZATION (3d ed., 2009), available 
at https://perma.cc/DAK5-34BX; C. Looker & H. Kelly, No-fault compensation 
following adverse events attributed to vaccination: a review of international pro-
grammes, BULLETIN OF THE WHO (2011), available at https://perma.cc/4KVD-
79XB; C. Looker & H. Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse Events 
Attributed to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes, 89 BULLETIN 
OF THE WHO 371; S. F. HALABI & S. B. OMER, A Global Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation System, 317 JAMA 471 (2017). 




motor vehicles: as it was noted, “seat belts can cause injuries but it 
is vastly more likely that they will protect you. It is all about proba-
bilities and the chances are on the side of wearing seat belts.”73 
Second, foreign “no-fault” systems recalled above are rather dif-
ferent and their features depend upon the different jurisdictions they 
belong to. As noted above, within the existing “no-fault” schemes 
there is no uniformity as to the extent of eligibility criteria for com-
pensation; whether the scheme should prevent continued access to 
courts or not; how these schemes are to be funded (the option being 
via tax revenues, privately, or via a mixed solution); whether a fi-
nancial cap should be imposed  on redress;74 whether the financial 
entitlement should limit to economic damage or include also non-
economic damage. Moreover, in some cases they apply rather auto-
matically upon the occurrence of the event (as it happens in Florida 
and Virginia if proof is given that the neurological birth injury oc-
curred as a result of the birth process) while in others an avoidability 
standard is adopted (as in European Nordic countries such as Swe-
den, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, where it is verified whether in-
juries could have been avoided if the care provided had been of op-
timal quality).75 Finally, the effect for the community depends on 
the legal and institutional context the scheme operates in, in partic-
ular with reference to the way the social security net is designed in 
each different country.76  
Therefore, it appears difficult to transplant any given scheme 
into a different jurisdiction without adaptation. I believe that there 
is much room for future research in order to classify the most rele-
vant variables, within legal systems, capable of influencing the way 
“no-fault” schemes (with the usual warning on the meaning of this 
concept adopted here77) may operate and define how such schemes 
 
 73. A. Giubilini & J. Savulescu, Vaccination, Risks, and Freedom: The Seat 
Belt Analogy, 12 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 237 (2019). 
 74. See, supra note 69, and the text this footnote refers to. 
 75. On this issue, see DICKSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 9. 
 76. Id. at 4. 
 77. See supra § I. 




need be adjusted in order to adapt to the different legal systems they 
are implemented into.  
Third, the legal transplant of any of such foreign “no-fault sys-
tems” may not reduce, in itself, excessive litigation (and, therefore, 
“defensive medicine”). As it was noted, the rather positive outcome 
experienced in New Zealand seems to depend on “the absence of a 
culture of suing in New Zealand” that pre-existed in the country,78 
which makes it unreliable that introduction of similar legislation 
could lead to similar results in jurisdiction where civil litigation is 
much higher and showed increase in the last decades.79 It is neces-
sary, therefore, to take into account cultural differences between 
countries and assess how much they may influence the outcome of 
the proposed reform.  
Fourth, foreign “no-fault systems” are currently showing defi-
ciencies as regards incentives to safety, in the absence of the deter-
rence brought about by civil liability80: in fact, pure “no-fault” mod-
els (within the meaning referred to here) raise concerns as to their 
appropriateness to limit the risk of moral hazard, exactly as it hap-
pens in New Zealand, since “the principal weakness of no-fault 
schemes is the difficulty of ensuring that the socially optimal 
amount of care is taken by potential loss-causers, as the links be-
tween their potential to cause loss and the costs of their actions are 
severed.”81 In this sense, I claim that “no-fault” schemes, within the 
meaning proposed here, should not apply out of the scope briefly 
mentioned here (i.e., compliance with scientifically validated 
 
 78. K. A. Wallis, No-Fault, no Difference: No-Fault Compensation for Med-
ical Injury and Healthcare Ethics and Practice, 67 BRITISH J. GEN. PRACTICE 38-
39 (2017). 
 79. OECD, supra note 20, at 16 et seq. 
 80. In general, on this point, see also DICKSON ET AL, supra note 69, at 5; K. 
Wallis, New Zealand’s 2005 ‘No-Fault’ Compensation Reforms and Medical Pro-
fessional Accountability for Harm, 126 NEW ZEALAND MED. J. 33 (2013). Of 
course, such a point is raised with particular emphasis by those who believe that 
deterrence should be considered as an indispensable effect of legislation on re-
dress; see, e.g., A. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181. 
 81. B. Howell, J. Kavanagh & L. Marriott, No-Fault Public Liability Insur-
ance: Evidence from New Zealand, 9 AGENDA 137 (2002). 




standards where there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or 
unskillfulness); otherwise the system would lose the deterrence fac-
tor that civil liability may still offer (e.g., providing application of 
“fault” rules in case of negligence).  
Moreover, such “no-fault” schemes should be combined with 
“fault” rules in order to take advantage of the benefits brought by 
each of them, narrowing their flaws by their reciprocal interplay. In 
any case, where these schemes apply, they should be matched with 
a set of rules capable of providing incentives for safety. I believe 
that, in those cases where no one can be blamed for ignoring the 
standards established, such set of rules should be uncoupled from 
deterrence on individuals (e.g., deterrence induced by civil liability 
should not be replaced with deterrence induced by disciplinary sanc-
tions, as it happened in New Zealand) and should rather be inspired 
by organizational and procedural criteria, thus shifting paradigmatic 
centrality from individuals to systemic risk management.82 
Of course, such an evolution would need to be accompanied by 
a cultural shift aimed at abandoning the desire for revenge often felt 
by damaged patients and their families and at rediscovering the im-
portance of a constructive relationship between doctors and patients. 
This issue falls outside the scope of this article and, regretfully, 
 
 82. Such a shift would be particularly relevant if one considers that many (if 
not most of the) medical injuries relate to unavoidable human error in a context of 
system failure: see TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (L. 
T., Kohn, J.M. Corrigan & M.S. Donaldson eds., National Academies Press 
2000); K. Watson & R. Kottenhagen, Patients’ Rights, Medical Error and Har-
monisation of Compensation Mechanisms in Europe, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1 
(2018). New Zealand is a relevant example in this respect. Before 2005, in New 
Zealand compensation was granted upon evidence of medical error. Since all find-
ings of error were reported to the Medical Council, “compensation could bring 
disciplinary repercussions for doctors,” which discouraged doctors and some-
times even patients from participating in the compensation claims process. This 
knot was untied in 2005, when eligibility was extended to all injuries caused by 
treatment and the prior reporting duties were replaced by a new duty to report 
“risk of harm to the public” to the “authorities responsible for patient safety,” 
which reduced doctors’ fear and improved information flows within the system: 
see K. A. Wallis, No-Fault, No Difference: No-Fault Compensation for Medical 
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cannot be dealt with here. It is relevant to note, even only inci-
dentally, that such a shift would require a more appropriate and ef-
fective attitude to dialogue in healthcare,83 in particular as regards 
acquisition of the informed consent.84 
Finally, foreign “no-fault systems” are designed, interpreted, 
and applied as “exceptions” to “common” civil liability systems, 
which are considered applicable by default. On the other hand, I be-
lieve that no-fault redress schemes (following the lexical convention 
proposed in this research) should rise, in relevant sectors and with 
reference to relevant cases, to the role of an independent and alter-
native system of redress on an equal footing to “fault” civil liabil-
ity—a sort of “double track” legislation on redress for damage. 
Of course, the adoption of such a redress system for medical in-
juries, targeted at the need to foster standardization of medical treat-
ments, would require the definition of many different variables—
which may only be briefly referred to here. First, it is based on the 
objective definition of certain standards as “scientifically validated,” 
also requiring an appropriate validation system. A third, independ-
ent party, must be in charge of assessing redress to damaged patients 
in application of the scheme, and care must be taken of its function-
ing and funding. It will also be needed to define standardized 
amounts of compensation. This is a critical issue under a systemic 
point of view, and the acceptance of such standardized compensa-
tion may strongly depend upon the way the social security net is 
designed in each different country.85 On all these issues, it seems 
 
 83. As it was noted, “the doctor-patient relationship is shaped by the quality 
and manner of information exchange”: see K. Watson & R. Kottenhagen, Pa-
tients’ Rights, Medical Error and Harmonisation of Compensation Mechanisms 
in Europe, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1. 
 84. On this issue, see, e.g., R. R. FADEN & T. L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY 
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(2006). 
 85. It is acknowledged that “no-fault” schemes are likely to lead to lower 
compensation in favor of damaged patients. There appears to be evidence to sug-
gest that “no-fault” schemes providing standardized compensation are more easily 




possible to draw inspiration, at least in part, from jurisdictions such 
as Sweden and New Zealand.86 
 
 
accepted in countries such as New Zealand and Scandinavia, where healthcare is 
understood as an important provision by central government and other forms of 
social insurance exist. On the other hand, countries with less of a social security 
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at 4, 54. 
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